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ABSTRACT
We present a growing collection of Android Applications col-
lected from several sources, including the official Google
Play app market. Our dataset, AndroZoo, currently con-
tains more than three million apps, each of which has been
analysed by tens of different AntiVirus products to know
which applications are detected as Malware. We provide this
dataset to contribute to ongoing research efforts, as well as
to enable new potential research topics on Android Apps.
By releasing our dataset to the research community, we also
aim at encouraging our fellow researchers to engage in re-
producible experiments.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile app development has witnessed an unprecedented
growth in recent years due to the increase in affordability
and adoption of smart powerful handheld devices. In par-
ticular, the Android ecosystem, with its open Operating Sys-
tem and the available Software Development Kit, have em-
powered developers to produce millions of apps for diverse
user tasks, ranging from mail and games to payment and
health activities.
Unlike the few established traditional desktop applications
which have been thoroughly studied by the research commu-
nity, Android apps are legion, each having a large share of
user base. Analysing these apps at a large scale is however
challenging since market maintainers implement several re-
strictions in collecting apps. In this context, researchers
proceed in a best effort way to reuse small datasets (which
are generally obsolete), or collect a limited number of sam-
ples (which may not be representative), leading to studies
which may be biased and experiments which are often not
reproducible.
To address the problem of Android dataset collection, we
have invested in a long-term effort to crawl apps for the
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research community. After several months of crawling, we
have already stored over three million of apps. With An-
drozoo, we aim to provide the software engineering research
community with an unrestricted, scalable and up-to-date ac-
cess to Android apps. To that end, we have developed spe-
cialised crawlers for several market places to automatically
browse their content, find Android applications that could
be retrieved for free, and download them into our repository.
To the best of our knowledge, the total number of apps
that we have collected constitutes the largest dataset of An-
droid apps ever used in published Android research studies.
Often, it is impossible to know beforehand how many apps
are available on a given market. Therefore, some of the
markets for which we wrote dedicated crawlers proved to be
much smaller than initially expected.
The crawlers we wrote follow two main objectives: a) Col-
lect as many apps as possible, and b) Ensure the lowest pos-
sible impact on the market infrastructure. These two ob-
jectives increased the cost of writing such crawlers since for
every market a manual analysis of the website has been per-
formed in order to detect and filter out pages with different
URL but with similar contents—for example lists that can
be sorted according to different criteria. Similarly, a unique
identifier for every APK on one market had to be found, so
that deduplication can happen before downloading apps.
While reducing the load we incur to markets’ web servers
may not seem strictly necessary to the objective of collecting
apps, it vastly reduces the likelihood of being banned by
market owners and hence, helps building and maintaining
in the long term a large and up-to-date dataset.
We present in this paper the architecture developed to
collect the Androzoo dataset (cf. Section 2), then we dis-
cuss the challenges for setting up a working infrastructure
(cf. Section 3). We also provide a few statistics on the
dataset (cf. Section 4) before enumerating potential uses
of Androzoo by the research community (cf. Section 5). Fi-
nally we discuss crawling limitations and provide concluding
remarks.
2. CRAWLING ARCHITECTURE
We now provide details on the applications sources as well
as on the multiple software components that were developed
to build the collection and analysis infrastructure.
2.1 App Sources
2.1.1 Main Markets
Google Play. The official market of Android1 is a web-
site that allows users to browse its content through a web
browser. Apps cannot however be downloaded through a
web browser. Instead, Google provides an Android app2
that uses a proprietary protocol to communicate with Google
Play servers. No app, however, can be downloaded from
Google Play without a valid Google account – not even free
Apps. Both issues thus outlined were overcome using open-
source implementations of the proprietary protocol and by
creating free Google accounts. The remaining constraint
was time, as Google also enforces a strict account-level rate-
limit: a given account is not allowed to download more than
a certain number of apps in a given time frame.
Anzhi. The anzhi market3—the largest alternative market
of our dataset—is operated from China and targets the Chi-
nese Android user base. It stores and distributes apps that
are written in the Chinese languages, and provides a less-
strict screening policy than e.g., Google Play.
AppChina. AppChina4, another Chinese market, used to
enforce drastic scraping protections such as a 1Mb/s band-
width limitation and a several-hour ban if using simultane-
ously more than one connection to the service.
2.1.2 Other Android Markets
The 1mobile5 market proposes free Android apps for di-
rect downloads: users can browse and retrieve thousands of
apps. Other crawled markets areAnGeeks 6, and Slideme7,
which is operated from the United States of America.
FreewareLovers8 is run by a German company, and pro-
vides freeware for every major mobile platform, including
Android. ProAndroid9, operated from Russia, is amongst
the smallest markets that we crawled. It distributes free
Apps only.
We also crawled HiApk10 and F-Droid11, a repository
of Free and open-source software on the Android platform
that provides a number of apps that users can download
and install on their devices. Many of the applications found
on F-Droid are modified versions of apps that are released
to other markets by their developers. The modifications
brought by F-Droid are usually linked with advertisement
and/or tracking library removal.
2.1.3 Other sources
In addition to market places, we also looked into other
distribution channels to collect applications that are shared
by bundles.
Torrents. We have collected a small set of apps which were
made available through BitTorrent. We note that such ap-
plications are usually distributed without their authors’ con-
sent, and sometimes include Apps that users should nor-
mally pay for. Nevertheless, when considering the number
of leeches, we were able to notice that such collections of An-
droid applications seemed to attract a significant number of
user downloads, increasing the interest for investigating apps
distributed in such channels.
1
http://play.google.com (previously known as Google Market)
2
Also named Google Play
3
http://www.anzhi.com
4
http://www.appchina.com
5
http://market.1mobile.com
6
http://www.angeeks.com
7
http://slideme.org
8
http://www.freewarelovers.com
9
http://proandroid.net
10
http://www.hiapk.com
11
http://f-droid.org
Genome12. Zhou et al.[6] have collected Android malware
samples and gave the research community access to the dataset
they compiled. This dataset is divided in families, each con-
taining malware that are closely related to each other.
2.2 Typical Crawlers
For most app sources, we developed a dedicated web crawler
using the scrapy13 framework. Every candidate app which
is available for free runs through a processing pipeline that:
1. Ensures this app has not already been downloaded;
2. Downloads the file;
3. Computes its SHA256 checksum;
4. Archives the file.
To check that an app has not been already downloaded,
we first identify a unique identifier for APKs in the market
associated to the crawler, and store in a CouchDB14 base
an entry market name–App identifier. As a consequence,
and because it is impossible to determine that two files from
two markets are the same unless both are downloaded and
compared, the deduplication is local to one market, meaning
that one file from one market is downloaded exactly once,
regardless of whether or not is has already been downloaded
from another market.
2.3 Google Play Crawler
Google Play has several features that make automatically
crawling it harder than other markets. As a result, a more
elaborated crawler is required for this market. Amongst
those features are the need for authentication with a valid
Google Account currently associated with an Android de-
vice, the impossibility to obtain a list of all available ap-
plications and the necessity to use an undocumented pro-
tocol for communicating with Google Play servers. Google
further enforces limits on the number of apps that can be
downloaded per Google account in a given period from one
IP address.
To overcome those limits, we wrote a software dedicated
to finding and downloading apps from Google Play. This
software is built with two components: a central dispatcher,
and a download agent.
We have used agents on up to seven machines located in
Luxembourg, France and Canada. On three of these ma-
chines, we ran two instances of the agent, one using exclu-
sively IPv4 connectivity and the other using IPv6. Because
IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are not linked in any way, this al-
lows to hide the fact that those two agents run on the same
machine, hence enabling us to increase the number of appli-
cations downloaded from one computer without increasing
the risk of being blacklisted.
Our Google Play Crawler infrastructure managed to col-
lect up to 296 448 new APKs in just one civil week, which
demonstrates the ability of our software to easily cope with
the volume of free applications published through the offi-
cial market. Thus, after several weeks catching up with old
applications, it appeared that two agents are sufficient to
keep up with the flow of newly released apps.
2.4 Collection Manager
The collection manager is a web service responsible for
all bookkeeping activities. It receives all the APKs that
12
http://www.malgenomeproject.org
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http://scrapy.org
14
https://couchdb.apache.org
were downloaded by crawlers, and stores them on the file
system, handling safely the potential conflicts inherent to
every parallel software.
It enables apps to be downloaded by authenticated users,
and provides a web page detailing statistics on the whole
dataset and on the recently added APKs.
This software component is written in Python using the
Flask15 framework. A PostgreSQL database accommodates
data storage and querying needs, and embeds parts of the
application’s logic in PL/pgSQL functions.
3. DATA COLLECTION CHALLENGES
We ran into several difficulties while trying to maintain
our infrastructure running. For example, two different mar-
kets were unreachable for a period of time longer than any
expected maintenance-induced downtime: 1) for a full month,
the 1mobile market was unavailable and then came back to
normal; 2) The market apk bang however completely disap-
peared just a few days after we started crawling it, never to
come back online again.
Other more general issues are the following:
HTML Stability. During the time we collected applications,
our crawlers had to be adapted about twenty times. Indeed,
very often each market made changes to the structure of the
HTML pages it generates. Most of the times, those changes
implied that the XPath expressions used to scrap useful in-
formation from web pages had to be fully rewritten, which
requires a new manual analysis of the web pages.
Monitoring Crawlers. Detecting that an HTML stability
issue is happening may not always be straightforward. For
smaller markets, it is not unusual to detect no new applica-
tion during several days. This can have two possible expla-
nations: Either no new application was offered by one given
market—in which case our crawler is working as expected—
or it could be that our crawler failed to detect and/or collect
the new applications—which could mean an HTML stability
issue happened.
Protocol Change. One market moved from a standard web-
site where applications could be downloaded from a web
browser to a model where applications could only be ob-
tained through a dedicated, market-specific application. While
we probably could have reverse-engineered the undocumented
protocol used by that market application, we considered that
it was not worth the effort and instead simply stopped col-
lecting apps from this market.
Information Loss. Very few application sources allow users
to download previous versions of a given app. Instead most
markets only allow the latest version to be downloaded.
Coupled to the fact that it is not unusual for apps to be
updated several times a week, it is impossible to guarantee
that all versions of all apps have been added to our collec-
tion. In addition, if a given version could be downloaded in
time before it is replaced by a new version in the market, it
will never be available again for collection.
4. ANDROZOO
Our dataset currently contains more than three million
unique Android apps, adding up to more than 20 TB. The
distribution of apps according to their source is shown in
15
http://flask.pocoo.org/
Table 1. The diversity of application sizes in our dataset is
shown in Figure 1.
Table 1: Current state of the AndroZoo APK repository
Marketplace # of Android apps Percentage
Google Play 1 899 883 59.70%
Anzhi 605 646 19.03%
AppChina 577 662 18.15%
1mobile 57 525 1.81%
AnGeeks 55 804 1.75%
Slideme 52 145 1.64%
torrents 5 294 0.17%
freewarelovers 4 145 0.13%
proandroid 3 683 0.12%
HiApk 2 491 0.08%
fdroid 2 023 0.06%
genome 1 247 0.04%
apk_bang 363 0.01%
Total 3 182 590 Unique apps
This dataset has been, and still is being built over time.
As a consequence, the number of applications in the dataset
is still growing.
4.1 Download API
The HTTP API that we provide allows to download full,
unaltered APKs. Each APK is actually a zip file that con-
tains: a dex file, which is the bytecode of the application,
at least one cryptographic certificate that signed this app,
various assets (images, audio files, libraries, etc), and a Man-
ifest file.
On the AndroZoo website we provide a regularly updated
list16 of available APKs (identified by their SHA256 hashes),
along with metadata on each app compilation date (dex date),
the number of antivrus engines which flag it as malicious
(vt detection), the size of the APK, the size of the dex code,
the main package name, the version, and the market where
the app was downloaded from. With this information, re-
searchers can select the subset of apps which they would
like to retrieve from AndroZoo using a dedicated API which
allows to specify the SHA256 hash of an APK that is re-
quested.
4.2 Example Statistics
We started crawling in late 2011, and have continued
crawling since. Over time, we added more and more app
sources, and optimised our crawlers’ efficiency.
Figure 1 shows the long-tail distribution of the APK sizes
in the AndroZoo dataset.
	1
	10
	100
	1000
	10000
	100000
	1x106
	0 	50 	100 	150 	200 	250 	300 	350 	400 	450 	500 	550
Nu
mb
er
	o
f	A
PK
s	(
LO
G	
sc
ale
)
Size	of	APK	in	MB
Figure 1: Distribution of APKs size
We have sent all apps in AndroZoo to VirusTotal, a web
portal that hosts over 60 products from renown antivirus
vendors, including McAfee, Symantec or Avast. Figure 2
shows the percentage of applications flagged by at least 1
16
https://androzoo.uni.lu/lists
antivirus product for each of the 4 dataset sources presented.
However, to stress out that results from antivirus must be
considered carefully, we show in Figure 3 for each data source
the percentage of applications flagged by at least 10 antivirus
products. Only 1% of Google Play apps now remain in the
category of malware.
GooglePlay Anzhi AppChina Genome
Malware Goodware
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Figure 2: Share of Malware in Datasets: Applications are
flagged by at least 1 antivirus product
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Figure 3: Share of Malware in Datasets: Applications are
flagged by at least 10 antivirus products
4.3 Access Conditions
We make our dataset available to the research community.
Given the lack of a clear, universal copyright exemption for
Research, we request that researchers willing to access this
dataset: 1) Evaluate the legal situation of downloading and
working on copyrighted applications with regards to their
situation (local laws, host institution policy, etc); 2) Do not,
in general, redistribute the data; 3) Do not, in particular,
make a commercial usage of this data; 4) Act responsibly
with this data, notably with regards to the maliciousness of
many apps; 5) Get a faculty, or someone in a permanent
position, to agree and commit to those conditions.
We politely ask that the origin of the dataset be ac-
knowledged, and we hope that researchers will make avail-
able the lists of apps used in their publications to make their
experiments reproducible.
5. LEVERAGING ANDROZOO
This dataset has already been used to conduct research in
the field of Machine Learning-based Malware Detection. In
particular, the scale of this dataset allowed to demonstrate
methodological issues when evaluating the performance of
ML-based Malware Detector [1], to emphasise the impor-
tance of Time in malware detection experiments [2] and to
draw a landscape of the Android Malware environment [3].
It also allowed to highlight the evolution of Android Apps
over time [4] by finding Antipatterns, and to detect Privacy
Leaks [5].
Potential usages could be found in the fields of Code Rec-
ommendation, large scale studies on API usage and adop-
tion, coding patterns, repackaging detection, Library detec-
tion and popularity analysis, Obfuscation techniques, Mal-
ware analysis, application similarity, etc.
Our dataset, thanks to its long-term coverage, is particu-
larly well suited to enable evolution studies. Indeed, in this
dataset are more than 5 000 apps for which we have 15 or
more versions.
6. LIMITATIONS
The number of apps in any given time frame may be
more linked to the our collection process than to the over-
all appearance of apps during this time frame. Indeed,
our crawlers are managed as a low-priority research project
rather than as a mission-critical production system. Col-
lecting was regularly interrupted for days, weeks, or even a
few months, for issues such as lack of storage space or more
generally, limited workforce to invest.
We have found that several market owners took various
steps in order to prevent their market from being automat-
ically mined. Thus, for such markets, we cannot guarantee
that we have retrieved their whole content.
For obvious reasons, we only collect apps that can be
downloaded for free.
7. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented the AndroZoo dataset of millions of
Android apps collected from various data sources. We make
this dataset readily available to the community to contribute
to more generalisable, reliable and reproducible studies based
on a large-scale, representative, and up-to-date samples. An-
droZoo stats are available at: https://androzoo.uni.lu
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